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We study optimal pricing in the presence of recommender
systems. A recommender system a￿ects the market in two
ways: (i) it creates value by reducing product uncertainty
for the customers and hence (ii) its recommendations can
be o￿ered as add-ons which generate informational ex-
ternalities. The quality of the recommendation add-on
is endogenously determined by sales. We investigate the
impact of these factors on the optimal pricing by a seller
with a recommender system against a competitive fringe
without such a system.
If the recommender system is su￿ciently e￿ective in re-
ducing uncertainty, then the seller prices otherwise sym-
metric products di￿erently to have some products expe-
rienced more aggressively. Moreover, the seller segments
the market so that customers with more in￿exible tastes
pay higher prices to get better recommendations.
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1 Introduction
The increased use of the internet for commercial trans-
actions leads to a large accumulation of data about cus-
tomers and products on the internet. In particular, the
sellers can easily build large databases that consist of per-
sonalized data on all their customers, the customers’ past
purchases and the feedback from those purchases. In this
paper we analyze one particular use for the information
accumulated in these databases, \recommender systems".
A recommender system is a software program which uses
the accumulated data to make statistical inferences about
what product a particular customer would like when she
returns to the website. The best example of such a sys-
tem is that employed by Amazon.com. Once a customer
makes a purchase there, the next time she logs on to Ama-
zon.com, a recommendation pops up on the screen for
her. There are many other internet sellers, such as CD-
NOW.com, Reel.com, Net￿ix.com, MovieLens.org, that
employ some version of a recommender system.
From an economic point of view, a recommender sys-
tem represents an informational linkage that creates addi-
tional surplus by reducing uncertainty for the customers.
In this paper we present a two-period, two-product model
that describes the interaction between a seller employing
a simple recommender system and a competitive fringe
with no such system, to analyze the surplus created by
recommender system and the di￿erent dynamics it gen-
erates in the market.
There are usually two sources of uncertainty involved
in the decision process of a customer. She may be unsure
1about her tastes and/or characteristics of the products.
In our model, we focus only on product uncertainty in
the on-line market for horizontally di￿erentiated prod-
ucts, where the di￿erence in customers’ tastes translate
into di￿erences in the willingness to pay for decreased
uncertainty. Our recommender system acts as a mecha-
nism that collects customer evaluations, through which
the seller infers more information about the products.
Rather than modelling the evaluation process for each
customer, we employ an information structure that aggre-
gates these evaluations into a single signal that the seller
receives on each product. The seller reveals whatever in-
ference he makes to his \loyal" customers, those who have
made a purchase from him before. Thus, a loyal customer
has the chance to make a better informed choice using the
inference revealed to her by the recommender system.
The surplus created by the recommender system can
be directed to increase sales and/or increase prices. In
this paper we focus on the role of prices by assuming
that each buyer has unit demand in each period. We
seek to answer how much of the surplus a seller with a
recommender system can extract from customers through
pricing in the presence of a competitive fringe.
The recommendation can be considered as an add-on:
it is an additional service a customer receives on top of
the purchase she makes. A similar interpretation along
the same lines is that, future recommendations are infor-
mation goods that are bundled with current purchases.
The recommendations and products form pure bundles
as de￿ned by Adams and Yellen (1976): it is not possible
to purchase the bundle elements separately. Recommen-
dations, however, are di￿erent from typical add-ons and
bundle elements because their quality is determined en-
dogenously by the information accumulated through the
seller’s sales. Thus the seller’s pricing problem incorpo-
rates the additional need to set the quality of the add-on
for each product optimally, which is equivalent to gather-
ing the optimal amount of information on each product.
Therefore the seller’s dual problem of what market share
to capture and how to distribute the buyers over di￿erent
products entails informational externalities. These exter-
nalities can be separated into two elements. The ￿rst
element is what we call the \volume externality". This
externality represents the general coordination element
inherent in the problem, which is that as the seller has
more customers, he will be able to make better recom-
mendations and thus attract more customers. This ele-
ment determines how much of the market the seller would
like to capture. The second one is the \product external-
ity". This externality relates to the distribution of buyers
within one seller over di￿erent products. If there are a lot
of customers buying one particular product in one period,
others may be willing to delay the purchase of that prod-
uct and be directed to other products for that period.
The strength of this e￿ect determines whether the seller
tries to accumulate equal amounts of information on each
product or whether there are increasing returns to infor-
mation so that the seller tries to induce large volume of
buyers to buy some products and provide information at
the expense of other products on which smaller volume
of information is gathered.
The volume and product externalities become stronger
as the recommender system performs better in reducing
uncertainty. We ￿nd that when the recommender sys-
tem reduces uncertainty only by a small amount, then
the seller prefers to gather equal amount of information
on symmetric products by pricing them uniformly. The
buyers with su￿ciently high willingness to pay for re-
duced uncertainty agree to pay this price to bene￿t from
the recommendation service and the others simply decline
this service and purchase from the fringe. For example
consider the book market. Suppose two novels \Double
Homicide" and \The Rocky Road to Romance"1 are in-
troduced for sale at the same time. It is very clear that
the ￿rst one is a mystery and the second one is a romance
novel. Hence there will not be many buyers willing to pay
a premium to receive information on the type of either
novel. There is not much the seller can gain by speed-
ing up the information accumulation, hence he prices the
products similarly.
Our results show that as the performance of the rec-
ommender system increases, the seller implements di￿er-
ential pricing which segments the market such that some
products are experienced by a larger group of buyers than
others. The buyers with high willingness to pay for re-
duced uncertainty choose to be in the smaller group to be
1These novels are new releases that can be found on Ama-
zon.com.
2able to use the information provided by the large group.
Those with the low willingness to pay choose to be in
the larger group to bene￿t from the lower price. In some
cases, this price is so low that it implies a loss for the
seller on that particular product. The seller is willing
to bear this loss because the information gathered allows
him to subsidize it through su￿ciently higher prices on
other products. Let us consider the book market again.
Suppose \The Syme Papers" and \Jonathan Strange &
Mr. Norrell: A Novel"2 are both new releases by new
authors. These titles clearly do not reveal any relevant
information about the type of these books. Customers
who are very particular about the type of book they read
to would be willing to pay a premium for more informa-
tion before they make their purchases. To extract this
premium the seller needs to gather enough information
on at least one book. Hence he targets one of the two
books, charges a lower price for that to speed up the in-
formation accumulation.
We investigate the segmentation in the market further.
In our model, the customers di￿er both in the type of
product they prefer and also in the intensity of their pref-
erence. Some buyers are more ￿exible in their choices
than others. It is the buyers with in￿exible tastes who re-
ally bene￿t from the recommendation service. The inter-
esting question then becomes whether the seller segments
customers of one type of product from the customers of
the other type or whether he segments the in￿exible cus-
tomers of both types from the ￿exible buyers. We ￿nd
that the former kind of segmentation occurs when the rec-
ommender system has a low performance and the latter
occurs when it has a high performance.
The road map is as follows: We discuss the related
literature in Section 2. The model is described in Section
3. In Section 4 we analyze the optimal pricing policy and
the resulting equilibrium allocation. Section 5 concludes
by discussing possible extensions for future research.
2 Related Literature
The possibility of increasing sales through recommender
systems has been documented by Chevalier and May-
zlin (2003). They empirically investigate the impact of
2These books can be found on Amazon.com’s website as well.
customer reviews on sales of books in Amazon.com and
BarnesandNoble.com. They ￿nd that the relative market
share of a book across the two sites is related to di￿erences
across the sites in the number of reviews for the book.
This enforces the idea that the volume of reviews has a
positive impact on sales. The possibility of an extraction
through prices arises due to the loyalty factor mentioned
above. Future recommendations might be considered as
add-ons to current purchases from a seller with recom-
mender system. Hence buyers may agree to pay higher
prices for the products they purchase from a seller with
a recommender system today so that they can receive
recommendations in the future. Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2001)’s empirical investigation of consumer behavior at
internet shopbots for books provide evidence for existence
of such behavior by consumers. They ￿nd that online
book buyers are willing to pay a positive premium to pur-
chase from the sellers they have either visited or shopped
at before. One interpretation of this premium is that it
is the fee for the information the sellers sell through the
recommender system to loyal customers. These empiri-
cal facts can support the role of recommender system in
increasing both the sales and prices.
Varian and Resnick (1997) give a brief description of
recommender systems and the issues they raise. They ex-
plain that the larger the customer base of a recommender
system, the more customers would be willing to use it,
which is equivalent to what we earlier described as the
\volume externality".
The analysis of recommender systems inherits some fea-
tures from the literature on product add-ons and multi-
product bundling. In the literature there have been many
di￿erent reasons given to why a monopolist might pre-
fer to bundle his products. Eppen, Hanson and Martin
(1991), Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee (1984)
suggest reasons such as cost savings, complementarities
between di￿erent products or extraction of more con-
sumer surplus as there will be less diversity in the valu-
ations of the consumers for the bundles compared to the
valuations for individual products. In our model there is
a strategic reason behind bundling. The seller is o￿er-
ing an information good not provided by his competitors.
However, the value of this good depends on the volume
of his sales of the main product. If he unbundles, on the
3product side he might lose buyers to other sellers which
decreases the value of the information good he is o￿ering.
Our results and methodology would apply to more gen-
eral settings that involve competitive sales of pure bun-
dles, where the value of at least one element in the bundle
is determined by the overall sales.
In computer science, the recommender systems we dis-
cuss here are formally known as \collaborative ￿ltering
systems". The \IEEE Internet Computing: Industry Re-
port", describes that Amazon.com uses a modi￿ed col-
laborative ￿ltering method referred to as the \item-to-
item based collaborative ￿ltering". This method com-
putes a similarity measure between the items rather than
the customers and then recommends the items similar to
what a customer has purchased before. Breese, Heck-
erman and Kadie (1998), Mild and Natter (2001), and
Ansari, Essegaier and Kohli (2000) describe and compare
other methods of prediction which range from Bayesian
methods of estimation to classic linear regression models.
In all these cases the physical procedure of making use
of other customers ratings to make a recommendation to
a customer explicitly reveals how the externality is in-
corporated into the problem. In this paper we take the
collaborative recommender system as given and model
the recommender system so as to generate some of the
externality e￿ects inherent in collaborative ￿ltering.
3 The Model
In this section we introduce a two-period model where
a seller with a recommender system and a fringe with
no such system compete in prices in a market for hori-
zontally di￿erentiated products. In this market there are
two types of the product and a continuum of buyers. In
period 0 two di￿erent products are o￿ered by the sellers.
The sellers and the buyers share a common prior about
the type of each product. These products are di￿erenti-
ated only with respect to the prior they arrive with. Each
buyer chooses a product to buy and a seller to buy from
in period 0. The seller with recommender system col-
lects information from his customers about the products
purchased from him in period 0. In the second period,
he reveals this information as recommendations to the
buyers who purchased from him in period 0. In the sec-
ond period a new product arrives at all sellers and buyers
again choose a product and a seller to buy from given
their recommendations. A buyer’s product choice In pe-
riod 1, each buyer decides between a new product and a















Period 0 Period 1
Decisions
made
Figure 1: The timeline
Market There is one seller with a recommender system,
denoted by M, and a competitive fringe with no such sys-
tem, denoted by F, in the on-line market for a particular
product group. Within the market, there are two di￿er-
ent types of the product, denoted by x 2 f￿1;1g. There
is a continuum of buyers in [￿1;1] with unit mass, where
each buyer is characterized by his preference ￿ 2 [￿1;1].
￿ is distributed uniformly in [￿1;1]. The gross utility a
buyer of type ￿ derives from a type x product is speci￿ed
as
u(￿;x) = v ￿ (￿ ￿ x)
2 : (1)
As an example consider the product line to be books.
Then the two types of the product can represent \mys-
tery" versus \romance" novels. We can consider the buy-
ers with preference parameters close to ￿1 or 1 as \in-
￿exible" and buyers with preference parameter close to
0 as \￿exible", because the former group would insist on
their favorite kind of book whereas the latter group would
not be adverse to trying other kinds. In a more general
context, it is the former group who has more to lose if
they get a product with a type further from their taste,
whereas the latter group’s utility decreases by little in
that situation. This means the ￿exible buyers could po-
tentially be the experimenters of new products if they are
given enough incentives.
The quadratic utility model is chosen for computational
ease and any utility function which decreases in the dis-
4tance between the ideal product type and the current
product type would generate the same qualitative results.
Timing and Choices There are two periods with ￿ow
of products and there is uncertainty about their types.
The sellers and buyers share a common prior on these
products’ types. In period 0 two products arrive at all
sellers denoted by l and h. These products are di￿eren-
tiated only with respect to the priors attached to them.
Let xi 2 f￿1;1g be the true type of product i 2 fl;hg
and ￿i ￿ Pr(xi = 1). We assume that the two products














. Hence the initial priors are di￿eren-
tiated by ", which we will refer to as the \initial infor-
mation". The symmetry permits us to represent the ini-
tial information by a one-dimensional parameter, but the
symmetry by itself is not essential for either the analysis
or the results to come.
In period 1 a new product, m, arrives with prior ￿m 2
f￿l;￿hg at all sellers. In period 0, neither the buyers nor
the sellers know what the exact value of ￿m will be in
period 1, but they attach 1
2 probability to ￿m being ￿h
and ￿l. The products l and h continue to be available in
period 1.
The marginal cost of each product for all sellers is c. We
assume that the price for each product in the competitive
fringe equals c. Each buyer buys at most one product
each period. Moreover, a buyer wishes to buy a di￿erent
product each period. We assume that per period outside
utility for each buyer is smaller than v ￿ c ￿ 4, so that
absent a better o￿er from the seller with the recommender
system, each buyer is willing to buy one product in each
period from the fringe.
Learning Between periods 0 and 1 seller M receives in-
formation form his buyers. We aggregate the information
as follows: Let ￿i denote the measure of buyers who buy
product i 2 fl;hg from seller M in period 0. Seller M
receives a random signal yi (xi) 2 f￿1;0;1g on the type
of each product i 2 fl;hg between periods 0 and 1, where
Pr(yi (xi) = 0 j xi) = 1 ￿ ￿i;
Pr(yi (xi) 2 f￿1;1g j xi) = ￿i:
We can interpret a signal of 0 as containing no informa-
tion, or simply the failure to receive an informative signal.
Given that the seller receives a relevant signal, the prob-
ability of the signal being correct is:









. We can interpret ￿ as the informative-
ness of the signal. The event tree in Figure 2 summarizes
the signal structure where x0
i 6= xi.
i m
1 – i m






Signal Arrival Signal Precision
Figure 2: The Signal Structure
Given the probabilistic structure, we view the recom-
mender system as a mechanism that computes the poste-
rior beliefs for each product i based on the signal yi and
reports them only to the buyers who have bought from
him in period 0. The posterior for product i given signal
yi will be denoted by
￿i (yi) ￿ Pr(xi = 1 j yi):
We assume that only buyers which bought from seller
M bene￿t from the information of seller _ M. This might
seem to be important restriction relative to the current
practice of some recommender systems who provide in-
formation even to new customers. However, we observe
that all we need for the pricing model here is that past
customers receive statistically more valuable information
than new customer. In many recommender systems this
occurs through personalized recommendations.
Pricing In period 0, seller M announces prices for each
product, i.e. p = (pl;ph) 2 R2. The search cost is zero for
all buyers, thus each buyer logs onto all websites and ob-
serves all prices, and then simultaneously chooses a prod-
5uct to purchase i 2 fl;hg and a seller to buy from s 2
fM;Fg.




h) 2 R3 and reveals the recommendations to the
buyers who have purchased from him in period 0. The
recommendation of a buyer who purchased i 2 fl;hg is
a report about the product she did not purchase yet, i.e.
an estimate about the value of j ￿ fl;hg=i. Given the
recommendation and the prices, each buyer then decides
whether to purchase the new product or the product she
did not purchase in period 0. Notice that a buyer can
get the recommendation from seller M and still purchase
from the fringe in period 1, because search costs are zero.
Interpretation There are two products arriving with
symmetric uncertainty attached in period 0. A high "
means there is less uncertainty about each product’s type
and that the two products are highly di￿erentiated. A
low " means uncertainty is high for both products and
that initially the two products look similar. In terms of
the books example, a high " would mean that either the
books have very revealing titles or the authors’ styles are
very well known. Similarly a low " can be generated by
very vague titles and/or new authors.
Through the signal structure we described in Figure 2,
seller M gains information about the type of the two prod-
ucts. Suppose a buyer buys product i from seller M in
period 0. Then in period 1 her choice set is fj;mg. The
recommender system supplies information to the buyer
about j’s type. Hence the buyer can make a better in-
formed choice between j and m. This describes the con-
tribution of recommender system and how it creates ad-
ditional surplus. The extent of this contribution depends





and we interpret ￿ as the \performance of the recom-
mender system". The reason is that when ￿ is high the
signals are more precise and thus the updating will be
more critical for the buyers’ choices, and when " is low,
the products are too unknown and any new information is
very valuable. Thus a high ￿ actually increases the e￿ect
of recommender system in reducing uncertainty.
Figure 2 shows that the probability of receiving a signal
on a product increases in the measure of buyers buying
that product. This captures the e￿ect that as a seller has
more customers, the recommender system will have more
input and make better recommendations.
4 Equilibrium
In this section we investigate the Perfect Bayesian Equi-
libria of the game between seller M and the buyers. The
seller M announces a price for each product in period 0
and each buyer optimally chooses a seller and a product
given the prices. It is entirely straightforward to ￿nd the
equilibrium if there is no recommender system, which is
equivalent to " = 1
2 or ￿ = 0. In either of these cases,
seller M and fringe F are e￿ectively selling identical prod-
ucts. The competition is ￿erce and the equilibrium price
will have to equal the marginal cost c. When we introduce
some uncertainty and informativeness into the setting,
the distribution of buyers in period 0 a￿ects the informa-
tion gathered and hence the utilities in period 1. As seller
M has the sole control over the distribution of buyers in
period 0, he controls how much information is gathered
for period 1. In period 1, seller M then reveals the infor-
mation he has gathered and announces new prices. The
fact that the seller can make the information distribution
conditional on period 0 purchases allows him to charge
the buyers in period 0 for the information they will re-
ceive in period 1. Therefore, he may extract some of the
informational bene￿ts through higher prices. This gives
him incentives to choose his pricing scheme to collect in-
formation. We will start analyzing M’s problem with the
subgame in period 1.
Lemma 1 (PERIOD 1 SUBGAME)
The minimum price in the market in period 1 in any per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium equals marginal cost for each
product.
This lemma is due to the fact that a buyer can get the
recommendation from seller M and yet purchase from the
fringe given the recommendation. The services all sellers
provide are identical in period 1 and the competition is
at the Bertrand level. The interesting part of the problem
is period 0 prices.
We ￿rst examine the subgame played between the buy-
ers after seller M announces p =(ph;pl). Given the dif-
6ference between the two prices the distribution of buyers
could be di￿erent. The following two properties of the
distribution of buyers over products will be central for
the determination of the equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 (BALANCE)
A distribution (￿h;￿l) of buyers is balanced if ￿h = ￿l




We would like to see whether the seller creates endoge-
nous di￿erentiation between the two products through an
unbalanced distribution and if so, which buyers bene￿t
from such an unbalance. In other words, if the distri-
bution is unbalanced, one product is experimented by a
larger group of buyers and the small group of buyers wait
to bene￿t from their feedback. If this is the case, then it is
also important to know the composition of these groups.
This suggests the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2 (SORTING)
A distribution (￿l;￿h) of buyers is
1. \sorted" if the set of buyers buying products l and h
respectively are line segments of the form [￿1;￿] and
[￿;1];
2. \shu￿ed " if ￿i > ￿j for some i 2 fl;hg and the set
of buyers buying product j consists of two segments




as the degree of shu￿ing;
3. \perfectly shu￿ed" if jS￿j = jS+j;
4. \with a gap" if the distribution satis￿es either of
above criteria except that a segment around zero sep-
arates either the buyers of j into two segments or
separates the buyers of i and j.
Figure 3 and 4 illustrate De￿nition 2. If a distribution is
shu￿ed, it is the in￿exible buyers of both types that ben-
e￿t more from the endogenous di￿erentiation created by
the unbalanced distribution. In other words, one product
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Figure 4: Sorting and Shu￿ing with a Gap
in￿exible buyers of both types receive good recommenda-
tions from the experiences of the former group. On the
other hand, if a distribution is sorted, it is usually the
in￿exible buyers of one type receiving information from
the experiences of all other buyers.
With these de￿nitions in mind, we ￿rst characterize
the per-period expected utility and then the two-period
value function for each buyer. The per period expected
gross utility for a buyer of type ￿ from purchasing product
i 2 fl;m;hg given ￿i is
E￿iu(￿;xi) = v ￿ ￿i (￿ ￿ 1)
2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿ + 1)
2
= v ￿ (￿ + 1)
2 + 4￿i￿: (4)
First, as we discussed above,in period 1 all the products
are sold at marginal cost so the buyers make their choice
to maximize their expected utility with respect to the re-
maining choice set fj;mg, given the recommendations.
Second, notice that equation (4) is linear in ￿i. These
two facts imply that, from a period 0 point of view, it
is the expected maximal (minimal) posterior that deter-
mines the expected utility of a buyer of type ￿ > 0 (￿ < 0)
in period 1. These posteriors for a buyer who purchases
















minf￿m;￿j (yj)g j ￿j
￿
:
A buyer with type ￿ > 0 who buys product i in period
0 expects to get a product with this posterior in period
1 knowing that she will choose the product with highest
probability of being type 1 once she receives information
on j. A buyer with type ￿ 6 0 expects to get a prod-
uct with a similar posterior, which this time is computed
based on the fact that the buyer will choose the prod-
uct with the lowest probability of being type 1 once she
receives information.
Hence, the two-period gross value function for a buyer
of type ￿ conditional on purchasing product i from seller























if ￿ < 0:
(6)
The expected maximal posteriors conditional on purchas-





















if ￿ 6 2"
4"2+1;
￿ ￿ " if ￿ ￿ 2"
4"2+1:
(8)










Equation (6) shows that the choice of a buyer in pe-
riod 0 a￿ects her expected utility in period 1 through the
expected maximal (minimal) posterior given in Equation
(7).
We observe from equation (6) that the two-period util-
ity of a buyer with type ￿ > 0 (￿ < 0) increases (de-
creases) with the expected maximal (minimal) posterior.
Hence a buyer’s preference over the two products may
change with these posteriors as well. To ￿nd the distri-
bution given prices, we need to know the gross preference
of each buyer, which clearly depends on both the ini-
tial prior and the expected maximal (minimal) posterior.
The following lemma derives properties from equations
(6) and (7), which describe how the preferences and in
particular the expected posteriors are a￿ected by infor-
mational changes. The properties are stated for buyers
with positive types and expected maximal posterior, but
the symmetric properties hold for buyers with negative
types.
Lemma 2 (VALUE AND INFORMATION)

















is supermodular in ￿ and ￿i + ￿i;



















Notice that point (1) combined with equation (6) re-
veals the \product externality" e￿ect. Point (2) helps us
determine when the seller might create an unbalanced dis-
tribution. As the distribution becomes unbalanced, the
utility of one group of buyers increases at the expense
of the other group. Point (2) implies that the gain from
an unbalanced distribution is higher when information is
more valuable. Finally point (3) reveals that the gain in-
￿exible buyers receive from information is greater than
the gain ￿exible buyers receive. It is this point that de-
termines whether the seller creates a sorted or shu￿ed
distribution.
Point (3) also reveals that the two-period utility func-
tion satis￿es the single-crossing property with respect
to the maximal (minimal) posterior, where the single-
crossing point is ￿ = 0. The buyer of type ￿ = 0 is
indi￿erent between the two products and hence her two-
period value function is not a￿ected by uncertainty. Point
(3) implies that, the buyers further away from the buyer
of type 0 strongly prefer one product over the other in
period 0 from a two-period point of view.
Point (4) implies that the preference rankings for all
buyers with ￿ 6= 0 is the same as the rankings of the sum
of ￿rst period priors and the respective expected maximal
(minimal) posteriors.
8To determine a buyer’s seller choice, we need to know
the utility she gets when she purchases either product
from the fringe. Notice that if a buyer purchases prod-
uct i from the fringe in period 0, she will maximize her
expected utility choosing from fj;mg in the second pe-
riod without any additional information. Then, the ex-
pected maximal (minimal) posterior in equation (7) with
￿l = ￿h = 0 determines her expected utility in period
1. Hence, the relevant variables are ￿i (0) and ￿i (0) and
the two-period value function for a buyer of type ￿ con-
ditional on purchasing product i from seller F in period
0 is
UF (￿;i) = UM (￿;i;0): (9)
Lemma 3 (FRINGE UTILITIES)
For all i 2 fl;hg and all ￿j > 0, ￿h+ ￿ ￿h (0) > ￿l+ ￿ ￿l (0)
and ￿l + ￿l (0) 6 ￿h + ￿h (0).
This lemma and point (4) in Lemma 2 together imply
that, if purchasing from the fringe, buyers of type ￿ > 0
choose h and buyers of type ￿ 6 0 choose l.
We can write the pro￿t of seller M as a function of p,
knowing that it will generate (￿l (p);￿h (p)). Alterna-
tively we can take a dual approach and write the pro￿ts
as a function of the market shares (￿h;￿l), which imply
a particular price vector (ph (￿);pl (￿)) that generates
them. We can hence write the pro￿ts as a function of
(￿h;￿l) as
￿M (￿h;￿l) = ￿h (ph (￿) ￿ c) + ￿l (pl (￿) ￿ c) (10)
Seller M chooses (￿h;￿l) to maximize these pro￿ts. Let























The ￿rst bracket represents the marginal loss, i.e. the
decrease in ph that is required to increase ￿h. This is the
typical loss a monopolist incurs in a standard pro￿t max-
imization problem. The ￿rst term in the second bracket
represents the direct marginal gain, i.e. the fact that the
mark-up is received from a higher market share. Again
this is the gain we would see in a standard monopolist
problem. What makes this problem di￿erent is the last
term in the second bracket, which is a direct re￿ection
of the product externality. The last term represents the
indirect marginal gain which is due to the fact that as ￿h
increases the two-period utility from l increases, hence
the same ￿l could be kept at a higher pl. The trade-o￿
between the loss and gain determines the optimal market
shares for the seller. The following propositions give the
solution to all these e￿ects and reveal the equilibria.
Proposition 1 (EQUILIBRIUM 1)
There exists a unique 0 < ￿1 < 1 such that for ￿ 6 ￿1










+ c for i 2
fl;hg;
2. less than full market share for seller M,
3. a balanced and sorted distribution with a gap where



















Figure 5: The equilibrium for ￿ 6 ￿1
Proposition 1 gives the unique equilibrium for low lev-
els of ￿. Low ￿ means either ￿ is low or that " is high.
In either case, the recommender system does not play a
big role in reducing uncertainty. The ￿rst thing to under-
stand is why the seller prefers less than full market share
in this case. It is clear that it can not be optimal to have
full market share and a balanced distribution, because it
yields zero pro￿ts and the seller certainly has other op-
tions giving him strictly positive pro￿ts. In consequence,
the optimality of full market share necessitates an unbal-
anced distribution. Increasing the market share has the
cost and bene￿ts, which were discussed in marginal terms
in equation (12). The direct gain is that more buyers pur-
chase from seller M. The direct loss is that it requires an
initial prices decrease for at least one product. However,
this loss is dampened because the increase in the market
share leads to an increase in the utility from buying some
9product from seller M. This is a result of the product
externality we described earlier. Therefore, as an indi-
rect gain, the seller will either be able to not decrease the
price as much to generate the same market share increase
or increase the price of one product while decreasing the
other. Consider the two-period utilities normalized by
". When ￿ is low, equations (6) and (7) imply that the
utility di￿erence between purchasing from sellers M and
F does not decrease by much as the buyer’s type gets
more ￿exible. Hence, the initial price decrease needed to
generate a given market share increase is not large. How-
ever, the indirect gain is not large either. Because, by
Lemma 1, if ￿ is low, the normalized utility of a buyer
increases by very little as market share increases. Propo-
sition 1 says that for low ￿, the indirect gain is not strong
enough compared to the direct price decrease e￿ect and
thus the seller chooses to leave out some buyers. The sim-
ilar reasoning applies to the choice of degree of balance.
Therefore, for low ￿, the seller prefers to make pro￿ts
simply by increasing the price equally on both products
to a level that su￿ciently in￿exible buyers are willing to
pay to have access to new information in period 1. The
seller’s problem can be interpreted as separated into two
disjoint markets, in each of which he sells a higher qual-
ity product compared to the fringe and thus sets a higher
price.
Proposition 2 (EQUILIBRIUM 2)
There exists ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3 such that for ￿1 < ￿ 6 ￿3 there
exist two symmetric equilibria identi￿ed with i 2 fl;hg
and characterized by
1. p￿
i > c and p￿
j
(
< c if ￿1 < ￿ < ￿2;
= c if ￿2 6 ￿ 6 ￿3;
2. full market share for seller M,






Figure 6: A symmetric equilibrium for ￿1 < ￿ 6 ￿3
Proposition 2 ￿rst reveals that there exists intermediate
values of ￿ for which the seller captures the whole market.
As explained above, the direct loss due to increasing the
market share and the degree of unbalance, i.e. the direct
price decrease, increases with ￿, because the buyers get
more di￿erentiated with respect to how much they prefer
buying from seller M to the fringe. However, the indirect
gain also increases in ￿ since the utilities become more
responsive to changes in the market shares. Propositions
1 and 2 say that the indirect gain increases faster than
the direct loss. The more intriguing thing is that for ￿1 <
￿ < ￿2, the seller is willing to make a loss on one product,
because this allows a price increase on the other product
that more than covers the loss. Then as ￿ increases over
￿2, even for the buyers with type ￿ < 0, buying product
h from seller M becomes a better choice than buying
product l from seller F and thus the necessity to decrease
the price below marginal cost disappears.
Proposition 3 (EQUILIBRIUM 3)
There exists ￿4 > ￿3 such that for ￿3 < ￿ 6 ￿4 there
exist two symmetric equilibria identi￿ed with i 2 fl;hg
and characterized by
1. prices p￿
i > c and p￿
j = c;
2. full market share for seller M,







Figure 7: A symmetric equilibrium for ￿3 < ￿ 6 ￿4
Proposition 3 shows that until ￿ = ￿4, the indirect gain
dominates the direct loss. Moreover, ￿ here is so high
that even the buyers of type ￿ > 0 prefer product l to
product h when buying from seller M. The seller makes
use of this preference structure by including the in￿exible
buyers of both types in the group that pays a high price
to receive the information provided by the ￿exible buyers.
Therefore the distribution becomes shu￿ed.
10Proposition 4 (EQUILIBRIUM 4)
For ￿ > ￿4 there exist two symmetric equilibria identi￿ed
with i 2 fl;hg and characterized by
1. prices p￿
i (￿;") > p￿
j (￿;") > c;
2. less than full market share for seller M,
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Figure 8: A symmetric equilibrium for ￿ > ￿4
After ￿ = ￿4, we see a reverse pattern. The seller
chooses a less than full market share, because once again,
the indirect gain from increasing the market share be-
comes smaller than the direct loss. For ￿ > ￿4, the utility
di￿erence between buying l from seller M and buying
from F decreases sharply as the type gets more ￿exible.
Hence, the price increase due to leaving out some buyers
of one product is so high that it more than compensates
for the loss incurred on the buyers of the other product.
As the next proposition shows the reversal of these two
e￿ects also implies that the total market share and the
degree of unbalance keep decreasing for all ￿ > ￿4.
Proposition 5 summarize the comparative statics e￿ects
of an increase in the informativeness of ￿.
Proposition 5 (COMPARATIVE STATIC)
In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium ,
1. if ￿ < ￿1 the measures of buyers buying either product
from either seller do not change with ￿,
2. if ￿1 6 ￿ < ￿3, the degree of unbalance increases in
￿,
3. if ￿3 6 ￿ < ￿4, the degree of unbalance decreases and
the degree of shu￿ing increases in ￿;
4. if ￿ > ￿4, total market share and the degree of unbal-
ance decreases in ￿,
5. as ￿ ! 1, the distribution of buyers becomes per-
fectly shu￿ed.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the existence of a recommender sys-
tem creates additional surplus and introduces informa-
tional externalities into the pricing problem of the seller.
If the output of the recommender system were indepen-
dent of sales, then employing a recommender system
would be equivalent to o￿ering a high quality product in
a horizontally di￿erentiated market. This problem would
be very standard and the seller would simply charge a
higher price for a higher quality product. Our ￿ndings
show that when the recommender system does little to
reduce the uncertainty, then this is indeed the way the
seller handles the problem by segmenting the market into
in￿exible buyers, who agree to pay a high price for the
high quality service and ￿exible buyers, who are left to
buy elsewhere.
However, when the contribution of the recommender
system increases, the seller’s problem includes concerns
that relate to gathering the optimal level of informa-
tion on each product. We showed that in this case the
seller creates endogenous di￿erentiation between other-
wise symmetric products by segmenting the market into
two groups: (1) a large group of ￿exible buyers who con-
stitute the experimenters and pay lower prices in return
for the service they provide, (2) a smaller group of in￿ex-
ible buyers who pay higher prices to have access to the
feedback from the ￿rst group. The optimal segmentation
for the seller is not necessarily optimal for the society.
The full potential of the recommender system is not re-
alized by the pricing scheme implemented by the seller
because the seller might waste some information by not
capturing the whole market. Moreover, even when he
captures full market share, he chooses to over-utilize the
system for some products and under-utilize it for others.
There are a few things that our model does not in-
corporate. First, recommender system can be used to
increase sales through encouraging cross-sales or turning
browsers into shoppers. A very simple way to think about
this problem is to consider a world in which risk averse
customers may not purchase the product because of the
11uncertainty about its true value. However, by o￿ering in-
formation to the buyer which reduces the uncertainty, the
seller could convince the buyer to purchase the product.
Second, it is possible that non-loyal customers are also
asked to leave feedback about the products they have pur-
chased from other sellers once they log onto a particular
seller’s website. This only enlarges the database the seller
keeps on each product, enhances the quality of the service
he provides and hence contributes to his further extrac-
tion of the surplus. This may lead to the unbundling of
recommendation and product and creates the possibility
for the seller to charge for the recommendations sepa-
rately. Finally, we did not consider uncertainty about
one’s own taste. With buyers to be uncertain about their
tastes and the recommender system may be able to corre-
late their past purchases with aggregate information that
would generate additional value to the customer.
Ultimately, we may be interested in the design of the
recommendation mechanism itself. Currently, all the re-
search by computer scientists focuses on either writing the
most e￿cient or predictive recommender system. How-
ever, strategic concerns are not included in the process of
writing the program for a recommender system. It is clear
that the recommender system is a mechanism and trying
to design the most pro￿table mechanism for the seller
would be an interesting challenge for future research.
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